Oil and Politics in Ecuador, 1972-1976 by Philip, George
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
INSTITUTE OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 
WORKING PAPERS 
Oil and Politics 
in Ecuador 
1972-1976 
George Philip 

Oil and Politics in Ecuador 
1972-1976 
by George Philip 
Lecturer in Latin American Politics 
jointly at the London School of Economics 
and the Institute of Latin American Studies. 
University of London 
Institute of Latin American Studies 
31 Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9HA 
ISBN O 901145 34 3 
ISSN 0142-1875 
FOREWORD 
The present work inaugurates a new series of publications by the 
Institute of Latin American Studies, taking its place alongside 
the Monograph Series, Information Pamphlets and other publications 
which have been in existence for some time. The object of the 
Working Papers is to preserve and present the results of research 
while it is still in progress, and to invite discussion among 
interested scholars from which the author can benefit. Research 
projects are developed at the Institute by its own staff and 
teachers, by research fellows and visiting scholars, by colleagues 
in the Schools and Colleges of the University, and by other 
scholars associated with our programme. These are the groups 
who have provided the stimulus for the new series, and it is from 
them that the authors of the papers will normally be drawn. 
The object of research is frustrated if it cannot find an outlet 
in publication; once published it can be improved by the 
responses of others. The Institute hopes that the Working 
Papers will help to satisfy these objectives and to promote the 
advancement of knowledge. 
J. Lynch 

OIL AND POLITICS IN ECUADOR, 1972-6 1 
When Washington launched its anti-OPEC offensive in 1974? 
it met resistance from an unexpected quarter. It was not 
surprising that in June 1974 the President of OPEC should 
assert that 
certain private companies, the international consortia 
and even the governments of the great economic powers, 
are uniting their strength in order to fight this 
organisation and bring about its destruction. But 
OPEC has known how to resist, despite the different 
forms of imperialist pressures such as diplomatic and 
economic boycotts, because OPEC's cause is that of 
the great majority of mankind - long exploited by the 
exploiters of every epoch.2 
What was surprising was the identity of the speaker - he was 
Captain Jarrin Ampudia, Ecuador's Minister of Natural Resources. 
Ecuador had only begun serious oil production in 1972 and 
its export capacity was barely 2% of that of Saudi Arabia. 
Nevertheless, the impact of oil was sufficient to bring about 
major changes in Ecuador's domestic and international outlook. 
It temporarily loosened the political boundaries of a backward 
Latin American country and paved the way for new men with new 
ideologies to take power and begin a major transformation of 
Ecuador; although more conservative influences were able to 
recover their position, they did not altogether succeed in 
reversing the changes that had been made. 
The key figure in these developments was Captain (later 
Admiral) Jarrin, who became Minister of Natural Resources in 
February 1972 and later President of OPEC. After his dismissal 
in October 1974, he became a symbol of Ecuadorian nationalism 
with both firm friends and very bitter enemies. In a sense, 
Jarrin follows an older tradition of Latin American military 
nationalism which can be traced back to Horta Barbosa of Brazil 
and even Mosconi of Argentina . In another way, he shares the 
"Third World" consciousness of thelites of many underdeveloped 
countries which has been able to assert itself only under the 
right material conditions. If Jarrin's outlook was deeply 
rooted in history, however, so was that of his conservative 
opponents, who willingly reflected Ecuador's own political 
conditions - personalist and weak government, a psychology of 
dependency and close connection with Washington. 
As we shall see, therefore, the "dependency" writers have 
accurately predicted the nature of political conservatism in 
Ecuador; during this period, a powerful foreign government and 
its domestic allies combined against a radical threat in order to 
suppress its most dangerous manifestations. During the crisis 
years of 1973-4? Ecuadorian sovereignty counted for very little. 
More surprising, however (at least in terms of this paradigm), 
was the emergence of a radical threat to the status quo not from 
the "broad popular masses", but from a military radical who in 
broad political terms was almost isolated but who was never-
theless capable of mounting a formidable challenge to the 
existing order. This challenge, and its outcome, are the 
subject of this paper. 
Ecuador in 1972 
When the military took power in February 1972, it found an 
oil industry which was economically quite well developed, but 
which remained a mystery to nearly all Ecuadorians. Ecuador had 
been a producer of oil since 1918 (although its coastal fields 
had always been small and were now almost depleted) but succes-
sive regimes had hardly concerned themselves at all with oil 
policy and for many years Ecuador levied few taxes, had no state 
company and knew extremely little about the industry. In 1967, 
however, a major discovery had been made in the Oriente, and was 
followed by a string of finds both there and offshore. By 1972, 
an independent survey carried out by Rudolf Martin and Associates 
put the reserves discovered by the main exploring company - the 
Texas/Gulf consortium - at 3,200 million barrels (proved and 
probable) adding that "Texas-Gulf have some twenty promising 
structures which have not yet been drilled". A trans-Andean 
pipeline was under construction and due for completion in June 
1972 with an initial, capacity of 250,000b/d; expansion to 
400,000b/d, or perhaps even more, was very much in prospect. 
The prospect of production on this scale had already brought 
some changes. There had been a major renegotiation of the 
original concession terms in 1969* a n e w non-retroactive 
oil law (the first since 1937) was introduced in September 1971. 
The 1969 negotiations had pushed expected government revenue up 
to reasonable levels in the short run but still left a great deal 
unclear or unsatisfactory. Overall, the question of government 
control had not really been tackled at all. Ecuador had no 
state oil refinery or even a firm contract to build one, although 
the matter had been under discussion at least since 1 9 6 6 . 
Moreover, although the 1971 law had set up a state company 
- Cepe - the legal terms of the creation were so unsatisfactory 
that Cepe had to be re-established in 1972. The question of 
acreage was also important; Texas/Gulf's concession area 
amounted in 1972 to 400,000 acres (which represented a substan-
tial reduction from its pre-1969 level) and other companies had 
concessions covering much of the rest of the potential oil-
bearing area. Apart from the question of size, there was also 
the fact that at least one (offshore) concession had been granted 
under very doubtful circumstances - a matter which would later 
become important. Finally, there was the question of admin-
istration itself; there was still much validity in the 
government's own complaint made in 1966 that "the state does not 
dispose of sufficient personnel to be able to carry out satis-
factorily the administration, control and regulation of all 
aspects of the oil industry".6 
This lack of oil policy reflected the weakness and backward-
ness of the Ecuadorian state itself. This was not yet capable 
of producing reliable statistics on its own activities, let alone 
carrying out coherent policy. As the World Bank remarked, 
different conditions and developments in these two 
major regions [Quito and Guayaquil] have over time 
deepened social and economic imbalances and prevented 
the emergence of a strong central administration. 
As a consequence, political power has remained 
fragmented into multiple decision-making centres - at 
the national, regional and local levels - including 
a multitude of autonomous and semi-autonomous 
agencies, each of them receiving earmarked tax 
revenue.' 
Indeed, in 1970? the goverment had already decided to earmark 50% 
of the royalties from the Texas/Gulf concession area to the 
Armed Forces and 50% to the electricity company - Inicel. 
This situation, however, did not relate simply to economic 
backwardness. The economy had grown rapidly in the years since 
1948, with the main growth point being the banana-exporting 
haciendas of the coast where a conservative, but modernising, 
'oligarchy' had grown up; during this period, there had also 
been a certain amount of industrialisation. Nevertheless, in 
1972, most manufacturing was still small scale and artisan and 
even the larger companies were relatively inefficient, as well as 
being capital-intensive and highly concentrated both by ownership 
and location (since they were predominantly based in Quito or 
Guayaquil). This pattern had led to an "extremely unequal" 
distribution of income which was aggravated by the familiar 
problems of un- and underemployment.9 
The urbanisation, which took place along with industrialisa-
tion, did have some effect on Ecuadorian politics. The voting 
population expanded from under 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 in 1948 to 8 2 7 , 0 0 0 in 1 9 6 8 
(out of a total adult population of around 2 million). The 
impact of this change was limited, however, by the chronic 
weakness of Ecuador's political institutions; fragmented and 
disorganised populist parties merely replaced the older 
fragmented and disorganised conservative groups. If anything, 
postwar economic growth made politics even less important than 
formerly. As Fitch pointed out, 
the new economic prosperity promoted a substantial 
lessening of tensions between the coastal oligarchy, 
the traditional landowning aristocracy of the sierra, 
and the increasingly numerous members of the urban 
middle class. With the increased opportunities for 
elite mobility outside of the political system and 
the rapid increase in the number of middle class 
bureaucratic positions resulting from the doubling 
of public expenditures, control over the government 
ceased to be a highly salient issue.10 
Bouts of serious instability coincided with periodic difficulties 
in the export markets, but these did not lead to any major change 
in successive civilian governments' basically conservative 
approach. In good times, change was not necessary; in bad 
times it did not seem possible. 
Under these circumstances, one might have expected the 
military to play a "modernising" role, and there were certainly 
tendencies in this direction. However, there had long been one 
major factor operating against this. Ecuador's military defeat 
by Peru in 1941 had been attributed by its army to the politicisa-
tion of the officer corps, and, following this defeat, there 
developed a strong "constitutionalist" mentality within it.11 
Over time, however, post-war influences, such as the spreading 
Latin American military ideology of counter-insurgency and its 
emphasis on the need for economic development, had come to 
influence army officers in a different direction. Partly for 
this reason, but also motivated by fear of "Communism" and 
disgust at civilian politicians, the military did intervene in 
1963 and moved in a vaguely reformist direction (putting an 
Agrarian Reform Law on the statute book in 1964-). However, the 
military government had no taste for the politics of mobilisation 
or confrontation and allowed itself to be driven from office in 
1966 by the determined opposition of the Guayaquil merchants 
who were able to manipulate both currency transactions and press 
comments in order to whip up an atmosphere of crisis. Despite 
this setback, however, the army retained a group of "develop-
mentalist" officers and these, further encouraged by the Peruvian 
example, later played their part in again stimulating military 
intervention. 
In the years after 1966, however, the most important changes 
were taking place within the navy. It is likely that the 
immediate impetus to radicalisation here was the "Tuna War", 
fought by the navy against those American fishing boats which, 
with backing from Washington, entered Ecuador's declared 200-
mile offshore limits. This "war", waged intermittently for a 
number of years, gradually escalated and 
suddenly became a major international incident in 
January 1971 with the detention of nine US tuna-
ships, including the largest in the world, the 
"Apollo", for fishing only sixty-three miles off 
the coast. In mid-January, the US Congress 
reciprocated by applying sanctions which included 
the suspension of all aid, credits and guarantees. 
Despite strong pressure, the Ecuadorian government 
did not flinch and responded by imposing fines or 
confiscating the catches of detained ships and by 
ejecting the U.S. military mission.12 
As we shall see, oil as well as tuna fish had an impact on the 
navy. 
The Military Government of 1972 
These changes within the military were catalysed by the 
prospect of oil. Few doubted that, when the oil began to flow 
in June 1972, there would be important changes in Ecuador, and 
this general sense of anticipation no doubt encouraged the 
military to take power directly. The February coup was actually 
precipitated by the efforts of civilian President Velasco Ibarra 
to use the military to block the probable electoral victory in 
June 1972 of his populist rival Assad B u c a r a m . ^ Velascofs 
tactics misfired, however, and the military took power in its own 
name. Indeed, for a number of officers the motives for the 
coup were not purely negative; rather, they themselves hoped 
to take the initiative in using the oil wealth to transform 
the Ecuadorian economy and modernise its society. One of the 
most radical of these officers was Captain Jarrin. 
Although appointed to the Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Jarrin was not an oil man. He had expected to become Minister 
of Education, but was given this more influential position after 
two more senior and conservative Naval officers had been vetoed 
by the Army. He was a military intellectual, and had been head 
of the Naval academy where he had propounded a radical form of 
the "national security" ideology. Moreover, Jarrin was a 
determined nationalist who had been influenced by the creation 
of Petrobras in Brazil, and who immediately conceived a strategy 
of gradual oil nationalisation in Ecuador. 
To this end, he quickly collected together a team of oil 
nationalists, which included both Ecuadorians and foreigners with 
experience of the industry.12 Organisationally, this group 
worked together very well indeed; the World Bank later referred 
to "a group of highly motivated and dedicated professionals, both 
at the Ministry of Natural Resources and the national oil company. 
Indeed, the improvement in the public management of petroleum 
resources has been r e m a r k a b l e " . W i t h i n the team, there was no 
doubt of Jarrin's personal ascendancy; one of his aides later 
recalled that "for the first few weeks he took our advice, but 
after that he took charge".^ 
Jarrin's position within the incoming government, however, 
was more difficult. There were some factors which worked in his 
favour. For one thing, the general orientation of the regime 
was nationalist; Rodriguez Lara had no wish to repeat the 
experience of his military predecessor who in 1963 had been 
severely criticised as an entreguista for coming to an understand-
ing with the US over fishing limits. Moreover, many officers 
had been influenced by Peru and, in any case, once the military 
had taken power away from conservative civilians, they needed a 
rationale for continuing to hold it. The fishing "war" itself 
had strongly implanted nationalist values' within the navy where 
Jarrin's policies were enthusiastically supported by the senior 
Navy Minister, Admiral Sergio Vasquez Pacheco. In any case, the 
overall climate in 1972 seemed ripe for a policy of oil nation-
alism; the oil had, after all, already been found and the 
foreign investment had already been committed, so that the 
bargaining advantage now lay with the host government. Moreover, 
the international climate of the period was extremely favourable 
to host governments, as was being amply demonstrated by the 
governments of Venezuela and a number of countries in the Middle 
East. Finally, in a country with so little technical expertise 
in oil as Ecuador, the calibre and expertise of Jarrin's team 
went a long way towards neutralising any neoliberal criticisms 
that his opponents might make. 
Against these advantages, however, there were serious 
potential weaknesses in Jarrin's position. The greatest of 
these was Jarrin's own lack of a political base. To some extent, 
this was the result of his own choice - both because he was a 
military elitist who showed very little interest in attracting 
civilian support or even in cultivating a strong personalist 
image, and because he sought protection against attack by 
ensuring that all of his proposals were fully discussed within 
the government and within the military before they were implement-
ed. However, there was also the fact that Jarrin was a Naval 
officer and so could not rely on strong personal loyalties 
within the Army, which was after all the most powerful of the 
services. Indeed, given the Army's power but its essential 
lack of cohesiveness, Jarrin was forced to build his house upon 
sand; it could survive the clear weather of 1972-3, but was 
swept away in the storms of 1974. 
From the beginning, however, Jarrin was determined to press 
ahead on a variety of fronts.17 Of these, one of the more 
important was connected with the offshore concessions. Here 
Jarrin was not a prime mover, but nevertheless came to be 
associated with the policies of the rest of the government, which 
consisted of a clamp-down on those suspected of "irregularities" 
in the acquiring of concessions. The real motivating force 
behind this campaign was a book written by J. Galarza (El Festin 
de Petroleo) which was the "first best-seller in Ecuadorian 
history" and which made blanket accusations against practically 
everybody who had ever dealt with the industry. In particular, 
Galarza attacked the granting of a concession to ADA in 1 9 6 8 . 
This was issued by the Arosemena Gomez government against the 
advice of its technical experts to six unknown Ecuadorians and 
was transferred six days later to an American consortium. 
Galarza!s accusations greatly increased in credibility in May 
1972 after a televised meeting between Galarza and Rene Bucaram, 
formerly asesor of petroleum of the Ministry of Mines and 
subsequently a Texaco executive. Bucaram declared that he had 
himself opposed the granting of the ADA concession, on the 
grounds that the ostensible applicants lacked the capacity to 
undertake the necessary work. His decision had then been over-
ruled from above despite the fact that the Industry Minister was 
out of the country at the time. Moreover, only 200 copies were 
issued of the official gazette which contained news of the 
contract. Although the issuing of the ADA concession was not 
particularly remarkable in the context of pre-1972 policy-making, 
the publicity which it attracted was such that the ADA concession 
was cancelled in November 1972 and a number of those connected 
with issuing it were temporarily placed under arrest. 
The most important aspect of oil policy, however, concerned 
relations with Texas/Gulf and the smaller companies of the 
Oriente. The first major step taken by the government was the 
issuing of Decree 43O (12th June 1972) which stipulated that 
those who had obtained concessions before 1971 would have to 
renegotiate them to take account of the 1971 law. This decision 
was not taken easily; according to one source,18 Jarrin was 
close to resignation before his proposals were finally accepted. 
Years later, Jarrin recalled that his opponents 
were those who were willing to allow the disappearance 
of the last trace of the 1971 Hydrocarbons Law, by not 
applying it until the year 2016, by which time all 
concessions would have returned to the state and there 
would not have been a drop of oil remaining in the 
Ecuadorian Oriente.19 
The main concern of the government was to recover acreage 
rather than revenue, and the first consequence of the new decree 
was a conflict with Minas y Petroleos. Minas was the first 
Oriente concession of the period, having been granted in 1961 to 
an Austrian geologist named Harold Strouth. The original 
concession made up million hectares and in August 1962 Strouth 
received permission to bring in other (foreign) investors. In 
1964, a large part of the concession was sublet to Texas/Gulf in 
return for a 2% royalty (upon which Jarrin in 1972 imposed an 86% 
tax). Subsequently, Strouth sold his share in Minas to an 
American consortium which included Aminoil, Amerada Hess, 
Hamilton Bros, and Kirby Petroleum. This consortium began work 
in the area (it later claimed that its investment totalled 
US $l8m.) and was prepared to continue developing its finds. 
The position changed abruptly, however, with the passage of 
Decree 430 which forced Minas to cede a portion of its territory 
and to accept considerably higher surface taxes. 
Thus, on November 20th, the New York Times carried an 
article on Ecuador which was clearly inspired by an oil company. 
It quoted an oil executive as saying that "we are trapped in a 
line of fire between the two big political factions in Ecuador; 
the Army and the Navy. The Army promised us protection but the 
radical Navy boys won the first battle to get rid of us". The 
article added that "a month after oil production began, the 
Minister of Natural Resources, Navy Captain Gustavo Jarrin 
Ampudia began to pressurise those companies still in the explora-
tion phase, ordering an increase in the payment of concession 
dues. President Rodriguez suspended the order." This hint of 
Army-Navy divergence clearly embarrassed President Rodriguez more 
than Jarrin who, after all, was only implementing the law and 
whose position was now strengthened by this clumsy assault. 
Thus Jarrin almost immediately replied to the article by accusing 
Harold Strouth of talking to the press and claiming that 
Minas was simply refusing to obey the law. There followed a 
lively polemic between Jarrin and company spokesmen (who claimed 
that Strouth no longer had anything to do with the company) 
before the concession was eventually cancelled in early 1973-
The main concern of policy, however, was the renegotiation 
of the contract with Texas/Gulf. The main issue involved was 
that of the amount of acreage which the consortium was to return, 
although domestic price levels, and Jarrin's concern to give Cepe 
a share in the consortium, were also important. Texas/Gulf 
tried to offer increased production as a bargaining counter 
against the government's demands, and the company even hinted 
that reserves might justify a second trans-Andean pipeline if 
the terms were r i g h t . M o r e o v e r , the consortium claimed that 
it had worked its entire concession area and initially asked 
US $70m. as compensation for its returned acreage. However, 
despite their apparently strong position, the companies had 
little to offer Jarrin. He had no fear of prolonged negotiations 
and the consortium's offer of higher output was of no interest. 
Jarrin had always aimed at long-term nationalisation, and his 
immediate aim was therefore to rescue as much as possible from 
the hands of the companies in order to entrust it to Cepe for 
development in the longer-term. For this reason, he had made no 
concession to Minas y Petr&leos (which could apparently count on 
a sympathetic hearing from other parts of the government - at 
least until the New York Times article) and had no reason to make 
any to Texas/Gulf. Moreover, Jarrin was a conservationist; 
perhaps influenced by Venezuela, he believed, in 1972, that oil 
prices would continue to rise and that oil left in the ground 
would therefore appreciate. Jarrin wanted to develop Ecuador by 
exporting less oil, but over a longer period and at a much higher 
price. Moreover, even apart from his price expectations, Jarrin 
was willing to hold back output out of a fear of the domestic 
consequences of an uncontrollable flood of oil wealth; he wanted 
to spin out developments more gradually. 
Others, however, were less patient. It is not clear 
whether consortium spokesmen quietly tried to put over their 
views to the more conservative Ecuadorians (although it would be 
surprising if they had not), but certainly there were those who 
wanted a rapid build-up of production and who were worried by the 
seemingly endless series of disputes taking place between the 
government and Ada, Minas y Petr&leos, Texas/Gulf, etc. Indeed, 
the conservative press kept up a line of criticism against Jarrin 
for taking too hard a line with Texas/Gulf and the other 
companies - particularly when a number of smaller companies, 
disappointed with exploration results and uncertain about the 
political climate, gradually pulled out. Thus, 
according to a number of observers, the virtual 
inactivity of the companies is due to doubts about 
the basic provisions of the new contracts which 
must be signed with the government. (El Tiempo, 2 Oct. 1972) 
Subsequently, it editorialised that 
the abandonment of territory, the departure of two 
new companies from the country following the same 
route as AMOCO, the virtual, paralysis of work in 
the Gulf of Guayaquil, the lack of interest with 
which work is going ahead in other areas, ought to 
stimulate an objective and profound analysis on the 
part of the military regime and the population as a 
whole, which is the real owner of the petroleum. 
January 1973). 
Even El Universo wrote that 
the exploration activity which several companies 
undertook at the same time appears to have stopped 
dead and....there are growing doubts about whether 
the Ecuadorian government has not miscalculated. 
(15 February 1973). 
It was certainly true that investment in exploration and even 
development had virtually dried up, but the resulting criticism 
was largely muted by the fact that the oil was continuing to flow 
and that the price was continuing to rise. Nevertheless, the 
rest of the government eventually began to pressure Jarrin to 
settle and finally presented him with an ultimatum - get an 
agreement or resign. When the agreement was finally signed in 
August 1973, Jarrin had a signed letter of resignation in his 
pocket.21 
According to the contract eventually signed, Texas/Gulf 
handed back much of their territory but were allowed to keep the 
rest until 1992. They would invest US $60m. over the next three 
years in order to bring the level of production up to 400,000b/d. 
Cepe was to be allowed to buy into the consortium, taking 2 o v e r 
four years at a price not revealed officially but believed to be 
US $65m. Financially, the Ecuadorian government had already 
achieved its objectives, through a complicated set of fiscal 
arrangements which could be regulated according to the changes in 
the tax reference price.22 In a market where prices were moving 
rapidly and where there was in any case no single world price, it 
is almost impossible to evaluate a particular tax structure, but 
the Ecuadorian government was certainly not generous. Already 
in mid-1972 the World Bank calculated that 
comparing the Ecuadorian tax system with the prevailing 
Venezuela or Middle East tax structures - using similar 
sets of assumptions as to costs and tax reference prices -
the level of most taxes resulting from the Ecuadorian 
system is higher than the other two. 23 
As world prices mounted, so did those set by Ecuador; they rose 
gradually from US $2.30 in July 1972 for 28 degrees API crude, to 
US $7.30 on November 10,1973 and the ceiling of US $13-70 set on 
January 1,1974- While not exactly comparable , this rate of 
increase is similar to that imposed by Venezuela (which rose from 
US $2.647 in 1972 to US $14.26 at the beginning of 1974). 
As Ecuador's oil revenue increased, so the question of how to 
use it became correspondingly more important. Here Jarrin was 
also active. His aim was to ensure that the bulk of funds did 
not simply flow into those industries (such as construction) where 
there was a short-term elasticity of supply at the expense of more 
socially valuable but longer-term projects. Thus, he used the 
old technique of earmarking, but reversed its direction. His most 
important step was to create FONADE, which was set up in December 
1973 and entrusted with all revenues stemming from a reference 
price of oil which was greater than US $ 7 . 3 0 . He also diverted 
the 15% profits tax which was intended for worker participation 
away from the workers themselves (who numbered very few) and into 
the health, labour and housing ministries.25 
It is difficult to trace out exactly the destination of oil 
revenue; the World Bank reported that 
since some important public sector agencies do not 
currently report their financial operations, it is 
as yet impossible to fully assess fiscal performance 
...similarly...the pattern of public sector invest-
ment during the period is unclear. It is known, 
however, that about one third of FONADE funds were 
allocated to a petroleum refinery at Esmeraldas. 
Much of the remainder has been allocated to the 
sizeable programme of electric power generation. 
In addition to these, there have been substantial 
increases in education and public w o r k s .26 
The estimates available, however, are as shown in Table 1. 
Despite the roughness of the data, a number of tentative 
conclusions can be drawn from this table. First, one should 
note the importance of FONADE which, after 1973, became the 
largest single recipient of oil income. Not only did this 
involve a proportionate reduction for all other agencies but, 
more importantly, the division of income (which gave FONADE all 
revenues stemming from an oil price of over US $7-30 a barrel) 
had interesting distributional effects. A change in the quantity 
of oil exported affected all agencies proportionately, whereas a 
change in the price affected only FONADE. Thus, a price cut 
would not significantly reduce the budgets of the central govern-
ment, military etc., whereas a cut in the volume of exports might 
hit them severely; this made Ecuador disproportionately vulnerable 
to company pressure. 
Secondly, the capitalisation of Cepe proved to be expensive 
- a necessary consequence of the speed with which it was done. 
Clearly, some of the funds diverted to Cepe were the foregone 
profits of the consortium, but much of the cost was borne in 
Quito. This did not really matter in 1974, when there was a 
budget surplus, or even in 1975 when the cutback in production 
seemed all-important, but in 1976 and 1977 Cepe's share of the 
total was seen to be considerable, and this became controversial. 
Indeed, after the nationalisation of Gulf at the end of 1976, the 
government (in July 1977) decided to reduce Cepe's share of the 
take by subjecting Cepe's income to a 17% royalty (of which the 
military was to receive 8 . 5 % and INICEL 8.0%). This reduced 
Cepe's income to 23.66% while further adjustments slightly 
increased the share of income destined for FONADE and maintained 
that going to the Central Government. 
Finally, there was a shift from current spending to invest-
ment, although the development and welfare ministries do appear 
to have benefitted from the changes at the expense of the general 
government bureaucracy. The World Bank's "others" category fell 
away sharply after 1972 and even the military budget seems, if 
anything, to have declined; conversely, housing and labour and 
social welfare at least maintained their share of a rapidly 
expanding total. The biggest shift, however, was from the 

Central Government to FONADE. Thus, at least on paper, the 
direction of government spending was positive from the point of 
view of development although these apparently determined 
desarrollista policies played their part in reducing the govern-
ment's chances of building up a political base for itself. The 
overall picture portrayed here is partly borne out by World Bank 
figures which showed an increase in government investment of some 
in 1973 (in real terms) and approximately 20% in 1974 
compared with real GNP growth of 15% and 8% respectively. 
However, this growth in spending was substitute for, rather 
than complementary to, a major programme of reform. In fact, 
many had hoped (and feared) that the new oil wealth would destroy 
the economic power of the Guayaquil exporters and permit the 
government to carve out a new political and economic base for 
itself through reformist-populist policies. Nevertheless, the 
regime lacked sufficient determination to pursue such policies in 
the face of strong conservative opposition; perhaps the key 
question, that of land reform, was decided in the conservatives' 
favour when the new law (of 1973) concentrated on improvements in 
productivity rather than redistribution. Whatever the 
"technocratic" justifications for this law, it failed to make any 
major impact on the political or social structure and politics 
was left to the established groupings. 
1974- The Crisis 
The dramatic world oil price developments of 1973-74 had 
their impact in Ecuador. This impact was all the greater since 
Jarrin had deliberately tried to link Ecuador as closely as 
possible to the other oil producing countries and had led it into 
OPEC in November 1973- In the eyes of many government ministers 
OPEC membership seemed to have its advantages; apart from the 
prestige itself, it might also strengthen Quito's bargaining 
position against the consortium. Certainly, the regime entered 
OPEC with its eyes open. As President Rodriguez Lara pointed 
out, 
every proposal, every step was considered in detail 
and submitted for the consideration of every govern-
ment member who was concerned with the matter, before 
responsibility was finally handed over to the 
Ministry of Natural Resources.27 
However, membership was even more important to Jarrin personally; 
he was anxious to use the oil weapon internationally to bring 
about changes in the international balance of power, and 
domestically to bring about changes in political attitudes. 
OPEC membership would help Ecuadorian nationalists 
ideologically, and would therefore provide backing for Cepe's 
gradual takeover of the consortium, and for foreign economic 
policies which would have been quite unthinkable only two years 
erlier. 
Nevertheless, Ecuador's membership of OPEC was always 
controversial domestically, and it proved to be more so as the 
costs of membership became more apparent- There were always 
those ready to argue that Ecuador, as a small producer and a non-
Arab state, was better off maintaining its own freedom of action 
since it had no interest in Middle Eastern conflicts and was in 
any case not powerful enough to play a real part in international 
politics. According to this view, Jarrin was suffering from 
delusions of grandeur; Ecuador simply was not Saudi Arabia. As 
a small producer, it should keep its traditional alliance with 
the USA, while at the same time benefitting from the changes in 
world price levels. Such a view was held particularly strongly 
within Ecuador's Foreign Ministry. 
This basic conflict became increasingly important as 1974 
wore on. At the beginning of 1974, Washington began its anti-
OPEC offensive. At first, this focused on an attempt to split 
Saudi Arabia from Iran and the more "hawkish" countries; at this 
time, the CIA believed that there was a real chance of Saudi 
defection from OPEC.29 Thus, on February 23rd the Guardian 
reported that "the American view, currently being urged on King 
Faisal, is that OPEC itself is in many ways irrelevant and that 
Saudi Arabia could go it alone". This pressure appeared to have 
paid off when, at the beginning of June 1974, Sheik Yamani called 
for a cut in the oil price to US $9 a barrel. 
As the expected price cut failed to materialise, however, 
Washington put increasingly public pressure on the other OPEC 
governments. Thus, in July 1974, the State Department "in a 
highly unusual move" publicly criticised Gulf Oil for paying 
allegedly excessive prices to Kuwait for its o i l . I n the same 
month, US Treasury Secretary Simon publicly described the Shah of 
Iran as "a nut".31 Similarly, Quito's decision in May 1974 to 
order a production cutback from 250,000 to 210,000 b/d met 
scarcely veiled criticism from Washington; US Under Secretary of 
the Treasury Jack Bennet remarked that "any new reduction in oil 
production, by any government, at the present moment, will be 
clearly considered by the USA and other consuming nations as a 
counter-productive measure".32 
During 1974, Jarrin worked hard to keep OPEC together. 
Since his work took place behind the scenes and he attracted 
little publicity during the period, his role was difficult to 
evaluate. Undoubtedly, however, his efforts to avoid an open 
split between Iran and Saudi Arabia were very much appreciated. 
The decision to hold the June 1974 meeting of OPEC in Quito, the 
success of that conference despite Yamani's plea for a price 
reduction made only a few weeks earlier, Jarrin's own appointment 
as President of OPEC, and the many messages of support sent by 
OPEC countries to Jarrin after his eventual dismissal from the 
government in October, all indicate that Jarrin played a vastly 
more important role in OPEC than might have been suggested by the 
volume of Ecuadorian production. 
By the end of August, the American diplomatic offensive 
against OPEC had clearly failed. The signal of this failure was 
Saudi Arabia's publication of its decision not to cut its oil 
price but to cut its production instead.33 Consequently, after 
OPEC's meeting of September 1974, Ford and Kissinger made aggres-
sive speeches to the U.N. which appeared to be aimed at persuad-
ing the non-oil-exporting developing countries to turn against 
OPEC, and seemed also to threaten some form of trade boycott 
against OPEC members. Kissinger asserted that nThe World cannot 
sustain even the present level of prices, much less continuing 
increases....what has gone up by political action can be reduced 
by political action". Members of OPEC were divided over the 
best way to respond to these speeches. The Middle Eastern 
countries, presumably believing that Washington's threats were 
empty but having no wish to provoke a confrontation, simply 
wanted to ignore these statements. The Latin American countries, 
however - both Venezuela and Ecuador - wanted to rise to the bait 
in order to strengthen OPEC's unity and to stake out a position 
in the diplomatic battle for the loyalties of the Third World. 
Jarrin, who had already gone out of his way to stress that OPEC 
had responsibilities to the rest of the Third World, then broke 
his silence to deliver rhetorical attacks upon Ford and Kissinger 
which finally precipitated his dismissal. 
This international situation was obviously important within 
Ecuador. There can be little doubt that the American Embassy 
encouraged the Texas/Gulf consortium to take a hard line against 
Quito in general and against Jarrin in particular. However, the 
state of the world, and Ecuador's, oil market made such persuasion 
more than usually acceptable. Ecuador's relative tax position 
during 1974 is extremely complicated and quite impossible to 
evaluate without inside information. There were various national-
isations (total and partial) in the Middle East during 1973-4, and 
the resulting confusion between posted prices, buy back prices, 
auction prices and various other forms of price was almost total. 
By August 1974, even the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly was reduced 
to remarking that "it is almost impossible to sort out the world 
oil price structure at the moment".35 
By mid-1974, however, one thing was clear. The world 
market had changed from a condition of deficit (brought on by the 
Saudi Arabian cutback) to one of surplus. On June 27th, the 
Guardian reported that "a substantial surplus has already started 
to accumulate. Storage capacity is almost exhausted. Within 
the next few weeks, the oil companies expect to start cutting 
back the rate at which they ship oil from the producer countries". 
As if on cue in Ecuador, 
at the end of June 1974, there were various breakages 
in the pipeline and the repairs held up production 
for more than a month, testing took several days more 
and, at the same time, the government faced its first 
pressures opposed to the increases in taxation 
decreed by the government. 36 
This breakdown compared interestingly with an earlier pipeline 
breakdown - in May 1972 - when the damage was repaired within a week. 
These international conditions need to be considered along-
side the condition of Ecuador's domestic oil industry in 1974. 
Indeed, the transformation of relations between Jarrin and the 
consortium from the relative harmony of late 1973 (when the 
renegotiated contracts had been signed with the companies) to the 
outright antagonism of September 1974 almost certainly owed a 
great deal to domestic conditions. The change began in March 
1974 when Cepe's offer of oil contracts, in preparation since the 
previous year, attracted a derisory response - with only Kopex 
and YPF applying for the available acreage. Since over 30 
companies had earlier expressed interest, the circumstances 
seemed suspicious. Jarrin blamed Minas y Petroleos for 
organising a boycott and on March 7th he made public a communi-
cation from Minas which made his point. In the communication, 
Minas claimed that it still had rights to part of the acreage 
(which had been its former concession area, cancelled in March 
1973 following Minas' refusal to pay the higher surface taxes 
decreed in June 1972) and threatened to sue anybody moving into 
it. Minas admitted that, at the end of February, it had sent a 
duplicate copy of this letter to all 35 pre-tendering companies. 
Since Minas had spent quite heavily in this area and had 
indeed found what it believed to be commercial quantities of oil, 
it is not surprising that Minas' letter influenced the bidding. 
Certainly other, undisputed, territory was also put up for 
contract but "this was geologically less promising. It is 
certainly probable that the terms themselves were not particularly 
attractive (although considerable scope was left for further 
negotiation) but there is no reason for believing that Jarrin 
intended the offer to fail in order to justify an intensive 
nationalist policy. On the contrary, Colonel Jaime Duenas, the 
head of Cepe at the time, had been pressing for even harder 
terms, presumably for tactical reasons since Duenas was not a 
figure noted for his nationalism.37 
Certainly, there is no doubt that Jarrin believed himself 
to be the target of a conspiracy. Thus, in March he attacked 
the press for its 
comments and editorials which are written by agents 
of foreign interests, which, though apparently concerned 
with national problems, always try to keep Ecuador tied 
to the exploitation of the great international markets. 38 
Moreover, this experience made him even more concerned with the 
values of conservation and nationalisation. Thus, he declared 
that 
we need to undertake a serious analysis of the 
national oil industry, in order to redirect policy 
towards a strict conservation of resources, we 
should plan in accordance with the universal theme 
of not exploiting hydrocarbons for the sake of 
exploiting them, since the petroleum which remains 
conserved will have greater value in the future... 
the oil which there is in the Ecuadorian Oriente 
will not remain in the bowels of the earth, as 
certain interested parties pretend; Cepe will 
exploit it on its own. 39 
This vigorous reaction brings out an important aspect of 
Jarrin's political approach. Whereas others might retreat under 
attack, in the hope of achieving their objectives by stealth or of 
securing a compromise, Jarrin reacted belligerently. Convinced 
that his days in office were in any case numbered, he tried to 
achieve the maximun in the shortest time possible. His concern 
was as much to change the mentality and consciousness of the 
military and the public administration in general, as to achieve 
longer-term political ambitions of his own. 
This attitude once more brought Jarrin into conflict with 
Texas/Gulf for what proved to be the decisive encounter. After 
the contract of August 1973, the consortium had intended to 
increase its output to 400,000 b/d.40 Jarrin, however, was less 
co-operative than the consortium hoped. Already his Ministry 
was becoming concerned with the way in which the fields were 
being operated, since Texaco had not only stopped exploration but 
had also cut down its field maintenance to the absolute minimum; 
officials feared that the fields might become irreversibly 
damaged. Thus, in early 1974, the companies 
stated with interesting optimism that the final 
recoverable output from their reserves was of the 
order of 3,4°° million barrels, and that they 
could plan a rate of production of 320,000 barrels 
a day if permission was given to them to increase 
output, from the authorised rate of 230,000 barrels 
daily. 42 
Of these 3,420 million barrels, however, only 1,726 million were 
proved. The consortium offered to develop the rest if they were 
allowed to expand production. Jarrin, however, insisted that 
they carry out sufficient development to prove these reserves 
before permission could be granted.43 Clearly, Jarrin's requiie-
ments would have involved considerable delay at a time when 
prices were at a peak and when the companies were desperate to 
boost output as a result of supply cutbacks and political fears 
in the Middle East. It is quite likely that it was this refusal 
which persuaded the companies that Jarrin was an irreconcilable 
enemy. Nor would their attitude have changed after May 22nd, 
when Jarrin ordered the consortium to cut back its production 
from 250,000 b/d to 210,000 b/d as a conservation measure. At 
the end of June, by which time Jarrin had again raised taxes 
(after the OPEC meeting of that month, he put up the royalty 
from 16% to 16.67%), the companies launched their counter-
offensive. 
Rather than go onto the defensive, Jarrin pressed on in the 
hope of achieving the maximun in the limited time remaining. In 
June, he was able to complete Cepe's purchase of 25% of Texas/Gulf 
and in the same month he pushed through a decree which authorised 
Cepe to take gradual control of the domestic market; 100% 
control was to be achieved in two years. In October, when on 
the point of dismissal, Jarrin sent "a signed bill to the 
Presidency for the purchase of up to 51% stock".44 If implement-
ed, this would have given Cepe control of investment decisions 
and would have reduced seriously the danger of a company boycott 
- although it is more likely that the proposed measure would have 
induced the companies to demand full scale nationalisation and 
thus led Jarrin into a showdown with his conservative opponents. 
In any case, he departed at the beginning of October and this 
proposal was quietly dropped. 
Eventually, therefore, Jarrin's opponents proved too strong 
for him, and on October 4th he was removed from the government 
and sent as military attache to the London Embassy. By this 
time, he was opposed by a number of old politicians, whose 
positions had been threatened by action taken by the government 
over the ADA concession and the state refinery. These had 
connections with much of the press which, traditionally close to 
the private sector, in any case resented Jarrin's attacks, was 
mistrustful of his radicalism and afraid of a confrontation with 
the companies and with Washington. Similar sentiments motivated 
the Ecuadorian business community; quite apart from its mis-
givings about the development of a more powerful and efficient 
state, it feared the short-term economic consequences of a 
serious conflict with the companies. To these open influences, 
which had to be somewhat muted for fear of encouraging pro-Jarrin 
sympathies within the military, must be added the more potent but 
quieter pressures working within the regime and within the army. 
There was an Israeli military mission in Ecuador which had already 
proved influential; during 1974 Jarrin had several times request-
ed but been refused permission to visit Arab members of OPEC while 
several army officers paid semi-official visits to Israel. 
Indeed, the Ecuadorian government has continued to follow its 
traditional pro-Israeli line, voting against the famous "Zionism" 
resolution of 1975. Washington's influence is difficult to 
discern but was surely present; in 1974, the Nixon-Kissinger 
foreign policy continued largely uninvestigated and the CIA's 
involvement in Chile had not yet come to light. Certainly, 
during 1974 a number of rumours circulated within the Ecuadorian 
Army to the effect that Washington would cut military aid unless 
Jarrin were removed from his post. Washington also had natural 
allies within the Ecuadorian foreign ministry whose traditionally 
pro-American outlook had been threatened by a man from outside 
the department.45 Moreover, when pressure mounted, Rodriguez 
Lara began to weaken; he was said to be increasingly concerned 
about the prestige accruing to his "Super-minister" and he 
certainly proved willing to dispense with him when he appeared a 
liability. 
Overall, therefore, both domestic and foreign influences 
seemed to be at work in removing Jarrin. His internal position 
was never so secure that he could survive a major crisis, 
although it had earlier proved sufficient to withstand the 
opposition of purely domestic conservatives. Indeed, it is 
notable that Jarrin's dismissal was precipitated by the rhetorical 
attacks which he made upon the American administration. El 
Tiempo explained that 
Jarrin Ampudia, referring to the speech given by 
President Ford at the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, said that American pressures were unaccept-
able and that statements of a "neocolonialist" 
nature had been made obsolete by events. 
These declarations were received with concern in 
conservative circles which branded them as demagogic. 
On the other hand, these same circles have said that 
the Minister had put Leftists in his ministry. 
(6 October 1974). 
Jarrin did maintain considerable support from those officers 
who were naturally sympathetic to a nationalist line and who 
believed that Ecuador had been put "on the map" by its participa-
tion in OPEC. His most valuable support, in fact, lay within 
the Navy and particularly with its head - Admiral Vasquez. 
These supporters did not have enough strength to protect Jarrin's 
position in October 1974 but they did make it difficult for the 
regime to repudiate his policies subsequently. Moreover, 
Rodriguez Lara had earlier taken care to present himself as a 
nationalist - when he opened the OPEC conference in Quito for 
example. Perhaps most important, however, was the fact that 
Jarrin's own boldness had made retreat difficult; his successors 
were always willing to make a few quiet concessions to the 
companies, but so much had happened that these were barely enough. 
The full restoration of "investor confidence" would have required 
an open capitulation from Quito, which the companies were not 
strong enough to force. 
Ecuador under Siege; 1973-5 
Once Jarrin had resigned, the companies tried to press their 
advantage. They were favoured by world market conditions and in 
particular by the growing surplus of crude oil which had become a 
glut by the middle of 1975- At the same time, the weakening 
world price, combined with Ecuador's fixed tax reference price, 
increasingly forced the hand of the companies; there is no 
reason to doubt company claims that their Ecuadorian profits in 
the mid-1974 - mid-1975 period were negligible or even negative. 
Moreover, Washington's interest in Ecuador, while somewhat 
diminished after the fall of Jarrin, had not disappeared entirely. 
This became clear when Washington raised the ADA question just 
after Jarrin's resignation. 
The ADA concession, as we have seen, had been cancelled in 
November 1972 as a result of alleged irregularities and for the 
next two years no firm decision was made on the future of the 
area. With the fall of Jarrin, however, Washington believed that 
the time had come to settle the matter and, late in October 1974, 
sent Quito a note which called for a return of the concession to 
ADA.46 The initiative met with a rebuff from Quito47 and 
Ecuadorian policy remained unchanged. Indeed, Washington's note 
appears to have stemmed from a remarkable ignorance of Ecuador. 
Jarrin, while a nationalist in other matters, had never been a 
hard-liner on ADA; even in 1972 he had recommended that 
compensation be paid to ADA but was overruled by the government.48 
Subsequently, he had tried to renegotiate the terms of the ADA 
concession with Phillips Petroleum (which had bought its way into 
the concession after it had been issued, and so was not concerned 
with its original acquisition) and in 1974 three times presented 
revised terms to the Council of Ministers, only to have them 
rejected; the regime was afraid of possible political scandal. 
Washington's relations with Quito did not improve at the 
beginning of 1975 when it issued its Trade Act denying tariff 
concessions to those Third World countries which were members of 
OPEC. Although it appears that this law was essentially aimed 
at the Middle East, it certainly had its effect in Quito. Here 
some pressed for the withdrawal of Ecuador from OPEC, but others 
reacted against yet another manifestation of "big stick" 
diplomacy. In January 1975, Washington also made it clear that 
it viewed with misgiving continued loans from the international 
agencies to members of OPEC - even the poorer ones.49 Nor did 
Washington's position in Ecuador improve when Agee's book (Inside 
the Company) was published in January 1975, providing an account 
of CIA activities in Ecuador in 1960-2, citing a number of well-
known Ecuadorians as CIA agents and recounting some of the CIA's 
methods of putting pressure on the government. 
Overall, it is likely that Washington's intransigence during 
the period was counter-productive. Quito was undoubtedly willing 
to make a number of relatively minor concessions to the companies 
in order to get activity moving again, but Washington's position 
made it increasingly difficult to do this without admitting 
defeat and, despite the removal of Jarrin, Ecuadorian nationalises 
at the beginning of 1975 were far from being defeated. 
Nevertheless, Quito was willing to make some concessions to 
the companies in order to try to secure a resumption of explora-
tion. The first of these was its decision not to increase its 
price level in line with OPEC recommendations at the beginning of 
1975. However, with world demand continuing to fall, this was not 
enough and further price reductions appeared to be in prospect. 
Thus, according to the New York Times on February 25th, "Ecuador 
...is likely to cut the price of crude within the next few weeks, 
following several months of strong pressure by United States 
petroleum companies". In the same month, the Ecuadorian Finance 
Minister predicted serious economic consequences if the oil price 
was not cut. As the Quito government continued to hold out, 
company pressure intensified.. On March 19th, representatives of 
Texas/Gulf met Rodriguez Lara and threatened to pull out unless 
three demands were met: the tax reference price was to be cut 
from US $13.70 to US .$10.25, the domestic selling price was to be 
raised, and companies were to be paid US $59-2m. which they said 
was owing as a result of local purchases by Cepe, Cepe's purchase 
of 25% of the consortium, and the Central Bank's delayed repayment 
of money which the companies had banked in Ecuador.50 
It is clear that the growing world surplus of oil was 
sharply changing the balance of power between government and 
companies. If the Ecuadorian government could not market its 
oil, nationalisation was an empty threat. If the companies did 
not need Ecuador's oil supply, they could afford to threaten to 
pull out, while adding to the pressure by cutting back production. 
In any case, the government was in no position to nationalise for 
technical reasons - it was still building up its own expertise. 
At the same time, three years of rapid economic growth had left 
Quito more dependant than ever upon a secure source of revenue 
and thus more vulnerable than ever to company pressure. In the 
first six months of 1975, Ecuador ran a trade deficit of 
US $150m., with oil exports down to US $213m. (from US $430m. in 
the first half of 197*+) and total imports up 69% from a year 
earlier. The oil honeymoon period was over. 
These reductions in income were particularly serious because 
of the weakness of the government's political base. Certainly, 
in 1975, the civilian Right began to recover confidence. In May 
1975, Camilo Ponce and Carlos Julio Arosemena (two civilian ex-
Presidents) formed a Frente Civico to oppose the Junta, in what 
was a deliberate carbon copy of the successful anti-military 
campaign in 1 9 6 6 . Unlike 1 9 6 6 , however, the fight had not yet 
gone from the military, among whom there were still influential 
nationalists. The most prominent of these was Admiral Vasquez 
who circulated a report on 18th May 1975 which argued that 
Ecuador should "act in close harmony with the marketing policy 
decided by 0PEC",51 and should also look for new markets within 
Latin America. Among other points, he argued that 
It is crucial to maintain price levels and 
increase state participation in the profits of 
the companies by means of a vigorous OPEC policy 
which should bring supply and demand for oil into 
balance on the world market and guarantee the 
conquests which the country has already made in 
this matter. 
Nevertheless, the nationalists could do no more than mount a 
blocking and delaying action, as the government gradually respond-
ed to the pressures placed upon it. Already, in March, the 
government had decided not to press ahead with the takeover of 
51% of the consortium after the latter had threatened to pull out. 
Even so, the government appeared to oscillate between promising 
concessions to the companies and threatening them with sanctions 
if they did not increase their liftings. Thus, on April 14th, 
the government ordered the companies to maintain a level of 
production of 210,000 b/d and gave Cepe the right to take its 
25% of this maximun figure rather than of the actual levels of 
production achieved. In fact Cepe found little difficulty in 
selling its 25% share of consortium oil, although most of its 
outlets were on the cheaper West Coast whereas most company oil 
had to take the more expensive route through the Panama Canal to 
the Caribbean. The contrast between Cepe's and the companies' 
sales was certainly marked in Ecuador, where El Universo 
editorialised on May 1 5 t h that 
The government must use its full authority and 
defend the principle that contractual obligations 
should be carried out by Texaco and Gulf since it 
is alarming to hear that Cepe is selling its oil 
normally on the world market. 
However, the majority of the government remained convinced 
that some further concessions would have to be made to the 
consortium. Their rationale for doing so was set out in a speech 
by the Natural Resources Minister, Admiral Salazar, given on May 
26th. According to Salazar, Ecuador's proved reserves amounted 
to some 1,5 billion barrels, which would permit present levels of 
oil output to continue only up to 1 9 8 1 . Meanwhile, domestic 
consumption was increasing, cutting into the exportable surplus. 
Thus, concessions were needed in order to encourage a resumption 
of investment activity. 
It would not be surprising if many of these reserve figures 
were found to come directly from the companies themselves, who 
were now interested in naming as low a figure as possible. 
Certainly Ecuador seemed to have "lost" a lot of oil since early 
1974, when Texas/Gulf told Jarrin that reserves amounted to 3.4 
billion barrels. Of course, the different figures reflected 
different calculations, and 1.5 billion barrels might have been 
realistic under the assumption that no work at all was done on 
the fields. However, Ecuador's real problem was not one of 
"fifteen years hence", but rather of immediate liftings and the 
immediate balance of payments. The government itself was well 
aware of this, and the emphasis on long-term planning seems to 
have been no more than an attempt to disguise its retreat. 
The question of OPEC was also important. As we have seen, 
Ecuador's membership of OPEC was a matter for strong conservative 
criticism and, in the early part of 1975? such criticism appeared 
to be justified. The world oil surplus increased substantially 
and it appeared to many that the price of oil was on its way down. 
Washington was continuing its diplomatic effort to bring about 
such a decline and the future of OPEC itself seemed in the 
balance. Thus, even as a small producer, Ecuador had a signifi-
cant part to play in the world market. A sharp price cut, 
possibly coupled with a withdrawal from OPEC, would amount to a 
sharp psychological blow against the organisation and would put 
more direct pressure on Venezuela. 
Rodriguez Lara, however, was extremely reluctant to take 
this path. He had opened the OPEC conference in Quito in the 
previous year and had associated himself closely with national-
istic oil policies when the political cost was low. Total with-
drawal, therefore, would have been a severe, possibly fatal, blow 
to his credibility. At the same time, however, a continuing 
fiscal crisis brought more immediate threats. As a possible 
escape hatch, Ecuador at the beginning of 1975 sought a large 
low-interest loan from OPEC; this application had Venezuelan 
support and was initially regarded favourably by a number of 
other countries. By June, however, OPEC interest had lessened; 
it was now increasingly clear that Saudi Arabia was willing to 
sustain the oil price by restricting its own production and 
consequently, from the perspective of the Middle East, Ecuador 
again came to appear a small, peripheral and generally unimportant 
producer. Thus, at the June meeting of OPEC, no loan was 
offered and almost immediately afterwards Ecuador cut its tax 
take by 43c a barrel (on 28 degrees API crude); this fell from 
US $10.84 to US $10.41. 
This price cut, however, was very much a compromise. The 
government claimed that it followed OPEC guidelines and both the 
Venezuelans and the domestic nationalists soft-pedalled their 
opposition. The reduction was sufficient to get exports back up 
towards 210,000 b/d, but was not enough to induce the consortium 
to resume investment; in August, Bucaram of Texaco was publicly 
pressing for a new tax cut.53 Indeed, the government appeared 
willing to make further concessions to the companies later in the 
year. 
At the end of September, the regime was able to put down a 
bitterly fought coup attempt, involving a Right-wing General, 
the Frente Civico and the major political parties; the precipi-
tating factor for the coup was apparently the regime's imposition 
of import restrictions on a number of luxury goods, in response 
to the worsening balance of payments position. Under these 
circumstances, it is not surprising that the government renewed 
negotiations with the companies in September, when Admiral 
Salazar was replaced as Natural Resources Minister by Colonel 
Jaime Duenas, an ex-head of Cepe whose differences with Admiral 
Jarrin had been well publicised. Accordingly, the government 
decided, in October, not to implement the full 10% price increase 
decided upon by OPEC during the previous month; this decision 
was presaged by Duenas1 remarks in September that, while Ecuador 
would remain a member of OPEC, it would "accept the decisions of 
OPEC as suggestions, but not as orders'1.^ In fact, the final 
price increase was around 6% although some sections of the govern-
ment wanted even l e s s . 5 5 For the rest of the year, negotiations 
continued, but no final agreement could be reached, largely 
because of the increasingly obvious differences within the govern-
ment itself. 
1976. The Consortium Splits 
By the end of 1975? the worst international storm had disap-
peared. By then, the survival of OPEC appeared guaranteed by 
Saudi Arabian willingness to cut back production, and the price 
increase of September 1975, together with the increase in world 
demand in the second half of that year, made it clear that the 
worst was over for the oil producers. Moreover, Ecuador had now 
decisively removed itself from the centre of world events - the 
fall of Jarrin and the price cut of July 1975 had ended Quito's 
brief flirtation with the Third World movement and foreign policy 
returned to a modified pro-American line. However, politics 
within Ecuador were less clearly defined; the military conserva-
tives had increased their power considerably during 1975 but the 
supporters of Jarrin were still quietly influential. The 
decisive domestic political battle had still to be fought. 
The coup of January 1976 was generally seen as a move to the 
Right, although the regime promised to maintain essential 
continuity with its predecessor and to go ahead with elections 
which were to have been held at the end of 1977 (and which are 
now scheduled for 1978). The head of the Junta, Admiral Poveda, 
was widely seen as pro-American and the senior army officer, 
General Duran, was similarly conservative. The continuing 
strength of the nationalists, however, could be seen in the 
appointment of Colonel Rene Vargas, ex-fyead of Cepe and a close 
friend of Jarrin, to the Natural Resources Ministry in place of 
Duenas, whose re-appointment had been widely expected. As would 
soon become apparent, however, Colonel Vargas had views on oil 
which were somewhat different from those of his superiors. 
A striking feature of the first few months of 1976 was the 
recovery of voice and confidence by the business community, which 
now felt it had the opportunity of coming to terms with the 
regime. Businessmen were concerned with oil in two ways; on 
the one hand, a constant flow of oil revenue fed its way into 
domestic demand and profits, while, on the other, oil revenue 
increased the power of the state and thus the threat of unwelcome 
government policy. In 1973 and 1974, when manufacturing grew 
by 7-8% and 11.6% respectively, a general sense of wellbeing 
tended to quieten protest, although even then there were mis-
givings that the state might use its oil revenues in various 
unwelcome ways.56 The anxieties and new taxes of 1975, however, 
although they did little to slow down economic activity 
(manufacturing grew at 12.5% in 1975), proved that oil abundance 
did not, of itself, guarantee the prosperity of the private 
sector. 
Thus, at the beginning of 1976, a co-ordinated series of 
statements were put out by various heads of commercial or 
industrial chambers, all to much the same effect. They argued 
that the cut in export revenues of 1975 should have taught the 
government that extreme nationalism did not pay, and that a 
careful conservative policy was required to encourage investment 
in oil exploration and thus maintain the flow of oil revenue. 
Moreover, the private sector was equally critical of what they 
saw as the growing state control of the economy; and Cepe 
increasingly found itself as a focal point of such criticism. 
Cepe's existence was not controversial. Indeed, the 
creation of the company had first been proposed by the military 
junta of 1963-6, and every subsequent government had at least 
played lip service to the idea before Cepe was finally set up in 
1972. Moreover, there was little disagreement about Cepe's 
initial steps - including the takeover of a number of old coastal 
oilfields whose concessions had lapsed, the drafting of service 
contracts and the planning of a state refinery at Esmeraldas. 
However, as the share of oil revenue diverted to Cepe increased, 
and as its organisational and technical problems became more 
apparent, so criticism mounted. 
Cepe's position was particularly important in that a state 
oil company was the only possible alternative to the foreign 
companies and thus a possible instrument for nationalisation. 
For this reason, Cepe was strongly defended by the nationalists 
and regarded with suspicion by the conservatives. The extent of 
this suspicion can be seen by the response to a contract signed 
between Cepe and ROMPETROL. This controversy was initiated by 
the Washington Star on 1 9 t h April 1976, which reported, a propos 
of nothing in particular, that Washington viewed with alarm this 
contract (which had initially been signed in May 1975, when it 
attracted little attention) since it increased Communist 
influence in Latin American oil. The story appears to have been 
drafted as part of a carefully timed move to put pressure on the 
Ecuadorian government now that negotiations with the Texas/Gulf 
consortium were once again reaching a crucial stage. This 
article provided a cue for Ecuadorian conservatives to attack the 
government and demand the cancellation of the contract which the 
government eventually agreed to do. While of no great intrinsic 
importance, this incident illustrates the extent to which 
Ecuadorian conservatives were willing to follow a lead from 
Washington in order to attack a government which could no longer 
be described as particularly radical or threatening to conserva-
tive interests. 
Certainly there were many serious problems with Cepe. It 
had expanded too fast, in too many different directions, and with 
too little conception of its own role. Nationalists pressed for 
an extension of its responsibilities into activities for which it 
was ill equipped (its takeover of all internal distribution in 
June 1976 was accompanied by widespread gasoline shortages), while 
conservatives seemed far more ready to criticise and attack the 
company than to suggest how it should be improved. Such 
criticism led to a defensive reaction by Cepe which resulted in 
further bureaucratisation and inefficiency. Essentially, for as 
long as Cepe was a political issue, under attack from vocal 
opponents and half-heartedly defended by a weak and divided 
government, there was very little chance that it would learn to 
operate effectively. However, until there could be some 
solution to the conflict between Quito and the consortium, Cepe, 
as a potential instrument of nationalisation, was certain to be 
at the forefront of the political stage. This impasse was only 
partially broken at the end of 1 9 7 6 with the nationalisation of 
Gulf. 
Indeed, the conflict between Gulf Oil and the Ecuadorian 
government was the major feature of 1976- It was accompanied by 
a growing difference in outlook between the two companies of the 
consortium. Texaco was more accommodating than Gulf, partly 
because it sold Ecuadorian oil directly to its own subsidiary 
and so could charge itself whatever prices were most convenient 
whereas Gulf had to sell on the open market. There may also have 
been more subjective reasons. The head of Texaco!s operation, 
Rene Bucaram, had earlier worked in the government bureaucracy and 
continued to enjoy good relations with many of its members, some 
of whom seemed to derive their whole knowledge of the industry 
from what they were told by the companies. Accordingly, it is 
possible that Texaco picked up the importance of the 1976 coup 
and the military's gradual move to the Right more quickly than 
did Gulf. 
In any case, for whatever reasons, even after the tax 
reductions of 1975, Gulf remained unhappy with its operations in 
Ecuador; it measured its rate of return as little better than 
5% as against the 15-20% that would have been satisfactory.57 
Consequently, it was prepared to take a hard line in 1976, with 
the option of pulling out if its demands were not met. 
The regime was apparently prepared to consider satisfying 
the companies, provided that this could be done reasonably 
cheaply. It began by trying to find out what Texas/Gulf's terms 
were. They were not left in doubt for long. It was reliably 
reported that in March the companies demanded a further fall in 
the tax reference price together with a further reduction in 
taxation. They wanted an extra 50c. a barrel profit if they 
were to resume the investment in their existing fields, and a 
further 50c. a barrel if they were to develop new areas. 
Although these terms were not acceptable, further negotia-
tions continued behind the scenes. Ostensibly, complete break-
down had taken place in March, and reports by the Petroleum 
Intelligence Weekly (8th March) and Piatt's Oilgram (17th March) 
stated that the companies preferred nationalisation to their 
existing position. However, this did not prevent the consortium 
from asking in May for an increase of 10c. a barrel in the cost 
allowed against tax, and promising that, if this was granted, they 
would embark on a programme of "reconditioning" the wells in the 
concession area, as set out by a study drawn up in March.58 
Although this request was granted at the end of May, it was 
clearly not enough, and, on July 27th, the Financial Times 
reported that 
although Texaco and Gulf have consistently denied 
that they would like to get out of Ecuador, it is 
an open secret that they have been discussing 
nationalisation terms with the military. 
Meanwhile, the government itself was divided over the oil 
issue. Colonel Vargas had presented a report to the government 
in March 1976 which responded to the consortium's call for a 
US $1.05 tax reduction by calling for nationalisation. In a 
detailed presentation, he explored the possibilities of national-
isation with compensation coupled with a short-term management 
contract with Texaco, and claimed that nationalisation could be 
made profitable if the oil were to be sold to other Latin Ameri-
can countries. The revenue thus generated could be used to 
finance the required re-investment in exploration. While this 
programme was not regarded with much enthusiasm within a cautious 
and conservative Junta, it was impossible for the regime to 
reject this position out of hand. Nationalisation, therefore, 
remained on the agenda; as the Financial Times put it, 
though internal divergences among the military 
have so far prevented any direct move to oust the 
Junta, many people feel that its prestige has 
fallen so low that such a step [ nationalisation ] 
seems almost inevitable. In particular, a group 
of progressive army colonels is making its 
influence felt in the political arena. Even 
if the Junta would like to remove Colonel Vargas 
and the head of Cepe, Colonel Luis Pineros, for 
their radical attitudes, the repercussions might 
cause its own demise.59 
Moreover, by mid-1976, Jarrin had returned from his diplomatic 
post in London and, in June, he launched a strong defence of his 
own and Colonel Vargas* position at the University of Guayaquil. 
However, despite (or because of) these pressures, the regime 
still found itself unable to take a decision. 
The storm finally broke at the end of July 1976 when Gulf, 
now determined to get itself nationalised, sued Arco for receiving 
Cepe's crude which according to Gulf, in reality belonged to the 
consortium (Texaco meanwhile emphasised that it had nothing to do 
with the dispute). The conflict went back to Decree 285 of 1*fth 
April 1975? according to which Cepe's 25% share of the consortium 
entitled it to receive 25% of authorised production of 210,000 
b/d, and not of actual production. The aim of the law had been 
to free Cepe from the semi-boycott organised by Texas/Gulf in 
early 1975 but by mid-1976, Cepe was selling oil at a marginally 
better rate than the consortium and was anxious to maximise its 
sales. 
On August 31st, Gulf went further and demanded its own 
nationalisation. Pineros, the head of Cepe, immediately demand-
ed that Gulf deposit in the Central Bank a figure corresponding 
to oil exports between February and August which had not been 
paid (although leave of 120 days was generally given for this). 
Gulf's move did finally unite the government and, on September 
7th, Colonel Vargas announced that Cepe was negotiating for 
Gulf's share of the consortium. Vargas also claimed that Gulf 
owed US $32m. in backpayments and further demanded that payment 
should be made within 30 days if Gulf was not to be confiscated. 
Even at this point, conservatives still mistrusted the 
direction of government policy, even though the regime had 
obviously been forced into nationalisation by Gulf and had no 
particular enthusiasm for the step. Consequently the regime 
felt it necessary to prevent the nationalist issue spinning out 
of control, and was therefore determined to avoid making political 
capital out of nationalisation or even turning it into a political 
issue. Thus, it discouraged the formation of a pro-national-
isation pressure group and, in August, banned a proposed "march 
for the nationalisation of oil". Moreover, Colonel Vargas, who 
had earlier tried to attract civilian support for a nationalist 
oil policy60, was kept out of the decision-making process as far 
as possible. In September, when the government responded to 
Gulf's payment of its debts by setting up a special commission to 
discuss compensation, Vargas was excluded - all the more remark-
ably in view of the fact that the commission included several 
representatives from Gepe and participation from the Central Bank 
and the Procuradoria. Negotiations in fact continued on a low-
key note until a working agreement was reached in December. 
According to this, Gulf would receive US $82m. and the difference 
between this sum (the government's valuation) and Gulf's valuation 
of US $117.5 m., would be decided upon by a group of accountants 
acceptable to both sides. Although there were a few loose ends 
which still needed to be tidied up, Gulf's assets passed under 
the control of Cepe which now had 62.5% of the consortium. 
Conclusions 
By the end of 1976, the military radicals had been defeated 
politically; a conservative regime, under full control, was 
paving the new way for elections to be held in 1978. Oil policy 
similarly changed; Cepe (now 62.5% owner of the consortium) 
reached a new series of agreements with Texaco that were expected 
to lead to a considerable increase in production over the next 
few years. New legislation was planned to end Cepe's marketing 
monopoly, and to restrict its activities to production and 
refining. When one considers broader questions, it is tempting 
to quote from Fitch's conclusions regarding an earlier phase of 
Ecuadorian history, 
after more than three decades of modernisation, 
the basic social structure remains intact, the 
economy remains wedded to externally controlled 
markets for primary products, and the political 
system still lacks legitimacy and institutions 
capable of mobilising support on a sustained 
basis. 
Indeed, like the 1 9 6 3 - 6 6 government, the Rodriguez Lara regime 
was "stranded between its adherence to reformist principles and 
its desire to be an accepted and 'democratic' leadership".62 
Much, therefore, remains the same. 
On the other hand, any evaluation of this period must take 
into account the cohesion and strength of conservative opposition. 
Moreover, it is clear that Washington played an important part 
in this, through its military connexions (and Israeli ones, which 
would surely not have existed but for American support), through 
the real economic power possessed by an oil consortium with close 
Embassy connexions and given the extent to which domestic 
conservatives were willing to follow a lead from Washington. 
While American support for domestic conservatives was occasion-
ally blundering, it was often effective and did play an important 
part in averting the immediate threat to their interests posed 
by the sudden increase in oil revenue and the consequent 
increase in the independence of the Ecuadorian state. 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the period, however, 
was not the eventual defeat of the radical challenge but rather 
the challenge itself and the extent to which it was successful. 
Although they eventually lost office, Jarrin and Vargas had help-
ed put through major changes in the Ecuadorian oil industry. In 
February 1972, Cepe had not even been properly created. By 
1977, however, it had taken responsibility for 62.5% of the 
consortium's production, was undertaking its own exploration 
efforts, had almost completed a major refinery and had taken a 
monopoly of the internal distribution system. While Cepe's own 
management had not inspired a great deal of confidence, the state 
company had at least established itself as a possible alternative 
to the multinationals, and there was no reason to doubt that its 
efficiency would increase with time. 
Moreover, membership of OPEC was a new factor in Ecuador's 
outlook. Even though Quito has retreated from the extremely 
active role played by Jarrin, it has not withdrawn from member-
ship and it is likely that OPEC's expertise and general outlook 
will continue to have some effect on the position of the Ecuador-
ian government. This influence may only be to accelerate 
changes that would have taken place in any event, but Jarrin's 
brief though important role in OPEC's assertion of Third World 
solidarity is likely to have long-term effects on Ecuador through 
its impact upon the consciousness of the younger officers. 
It is also true that, in many ways, Ecuador passed through 
these dramatic years very successfully, with its own indecisive-
ness at times rebounding to its advantage. Thus, in 1975, the 
government's indecision and drift were probably more successful 
in the long run than either total intransigence or capitulation 
would have been. Similarly, in 1976, the Gulf nationalisation 
was essentially forced upon Quito, but was highly advantageous 
it, both because it gave Cepe more power without a drastic 
increase in responsibilities, and because it made it easier to 
deal with Texaco once its more intransigent partner had disap-
peared. However, this indecision served to obscure the long-
term direction of Ecuadorian policy (no doubt greatly to the 
relief of the participants themselves), and it may be years 
before this is entirely clear. 
The future, however, will largely be determined by the pat-
terns of political organisation which may be thrown up by the new 
oil wealth. It is unlikely that politics can long continue to 
be fragmented, personalist and clientelistic now that the central 
government is in possession of a major source of revenue over 
which the main social groupings within the country have little 
control. It is almost inevitable that some major political 
figure or organisation will use this wealth to build up an 
effective clientele whose political reliability can be assured. 
One possibility is that the new centre-left parties will succeed 
in building up a base around the promise of a more organised 
"welfare" politics (on the Venezuelan pattern) with the oil 
revenue used to create and solidify popular organisations and 
with the oil industry being regarded as a source of finance for 
semi-reformist policies. In such an event, a modus vivendi with 
the companies and Washington would be likely. It is also pos-
sible, however, that if the return to civilian government expect-
ed in 1978 fails to produce any transformation to a more organi-
sational form of politics, then a new military government will 
take power, and will try to carry further the policies of Jarrin 
and Colonel Vargas by moving towards full nationalisation, 
possibly coupled with a more determined form of radical-populism 
than we have yet seen. It must be said, therefore, that the 
full significance of the 1972-6 period will not be clear until 
the longer-term political developments have a chance to work 
themselves out. 
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